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Abstract—The physical layer describes how communication
signals are encoded and transmitted across a channel. Physical
security often requires either restricting access to the channel
or performing periodic manual inspections. In this tutorial, we
describe how the field of quantum communication offers new
techniques for securing the physical layer. We describe the use
of quantum seals as a unique way to test the integrity and
authenticity of a communication channel and to provide security
for the physical layer. We present the theoretical and physical
underpinnings of quantum seals including the quantum optical
encoding used at the transmitter and the test for non-locality
used at the receiver. We describe how the envisioned quantum
physical sublayer senses tampering and how coordination with
higher protocol layers allow quantum seals to influence secure
routing or tailor data management methods. We conclude by
discussing challenges in the development of quantum seals, the
overlap with existing quantum key distribution cryptographic
services, and the relevance of a quantum physical sublayer to
the future of communication security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The physical layer is the lowest layer in any communication
protocol suite. Often abbreviated as PHY, it represents speci-
fications for generating, modulating, and transmitting signals
over a network. Securing the PHY layer, however, is notably
different from the other layers comprising the protocol stack.
Higher protocol layers resort to security schemes that naturally
lie within the cyber domain, such as encryption or digital
signatures, while similar capabilities for the physical domain
have not yet been developed. This is due to the fundamentally
different type of security required for controlling access to a
physical medium.
The security of the physical layer is typically managed by
restricting access to its constituent pieces. For example, fiber
buried underground is usually assumed to be inaccessible –
although this method of management is not reliable since
a buried fiber can be easily exposed by digging it up or
accessed through its service points. Many networks have large
spatial footprints and frequent visual inspection is simply
impractical. Automated diagnostics such as spectral analysis
or optical time-domain reflectrometry check fiber health, but
these methods are useful when the network is inactive and are
not intended for real-time, inline monitoring. In addition, these
methods require verified reference traces to validate each link,
and the number of those traces grows quickly with network
connectivity.
Alongside these practical hurdles, the physical layer also
exhibits a fundamental vulnerability that remains unanswered
by present security practices. The modern view of PHY has
been built upon the principles of classical physics, notably,
classical electromagnetic theory for preparing and transmit-
ting signals. This fundamental feature, although necessary,
also provides an attacker the opportunity to compromise the
integrity of a transmission. That is to say, by measuring the
frequency, bandwidth, and modulation of a transmission, an
attacker can resend a replica without revealing their presence.
This vulnerability, often described as an intercept-resend attack
or the man in the middle attack, derives directly from the
implementation of a classical physical layer.
Fig. 1: The intercept-resend or man-in-the-middle attack can
be implemented either by intercepting the signal using a
network tap or by monitoring leakage from a bent fiber.
The optical signal can then be sampled and analyzed. The
knowledge acquired about the signal can then be used to craft
a replica pulse that is injected into the fiber. The basis for
this vulnerability is the exact cloning of signals in classical
mechanical theory.
It was once reasonable to assume the technological so-
phistication required for intercepting and transmitting light
prohibited the intercept-resend attack at the physical layer.
However, advancements in both optical network technology
and computing power have greatly increased the feasibility of
this attack at relatively low cost to the attacker. A shown in Fig.
1, it is straightforward to intercept an optical signal using an
optical-electrical converter and to resend the same or different
signal using an optical transmitter. An attacker may also use
existing optical technology such as a repeater, multiplexer,
or fiber network tap to perfectly replicate the transmitted
light or use optical transmitter technology alongside a priori
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knowledge of the pulse encoding to inject a spoofing pulse.
Any of these methods can be used to exploit existing fiber in
the physical layer.
Quantum communication offers a means of securing the
physical layer by closing the man in the middle attack. This
capability can not be provided by conventional communication
but instead stems from the indeterminism underlying quantum
physics. The technology needed to take advantage of these
capabilities is now being realized and brought to commercial
markets. We expect that these components will be useful for
providing security for the physical layer as part of future
communication protocols. In this contribution, we show how
quantum seals can be realized and applied to securing the
physical layer. The presence of a quantum physical sublayer
within the network would provide a unique instance of a
cyber-physical systems that could be used to develop secure
communication services.
The paper is organized as follows. Following the Introduc-
tion of Sec. I, we present the Principles of Quantum Com-
munication in Sec. II, which defines the basic nomenclature
and physical principles. This followed by an introduction to
Quantum Optical Communication in Sec. III, which covers the
technological basis for a quantum seal. We next discuss the
operation and behavior of quantum seals in Sec. IV before
describing their integration into a cyber-physical systems in
Sec. V. That section also includes a description of how
the security of the physical layer can play a role in the
behaviors of higher-protocol layers and secure communication
services. Finally, we summarize the outlook for quantum-
enabled security based on a quantum physical sublayer in
Sec. VI.
II. PRINCIPLES OF QUANTUM COMMUNICATION
Quantum communication is rooted in the field of quantum
information, which also includes quantum computing, quan-
tum cryptography, and quantum sensing. At the heart of these
disciplines is the use of quantum mechanics as the underlying
mathematical framework. This distinction has been shown to
lead to several notable differences as compared to conventional
information technologies based on classical mechanics [1]. In
this section, we offer a primer on some of the principles of
quantum communication and especially those that may be used
for securing the PHY layer in a communication system.
Quantum communication, like classical communication, is
built up from logical states, namely, 1’s and 0’s. These logical
states are the information that must be encoded into a physical
system and relayed according to some chosen protocol. What
distinguishes quantum information from classical information
is how this encoding is accomplished. Conventional commu-
nication transceivers rely on classical signals to encode the
logical states, e.g., positive and negative voltages, electro-
magnetic carrier waves, etc. These signals are well described
by classical physics. Quantum communication differs as the
physical systems used to encode bits of information behave
according to the laws of quantum mechanics. This distinction
has proven to have dramatic consequences.
Fig. 2: The possible values of a single qubit map onto the unit
sphere, also known as the Bloch sphere. The upper and lower
poles of the sphere correspond to the logical states 0 and 1
respectively. A classical bit can only encode either the logical
0 or 1 state, while a qubit ψ can encode any of the infinite
number of superposition states specified by the angles θ and
ϕ.
Unlike classical bits, quantum bits, i.e., qubits, can exist in
superpositions of logical states. This means that qubits need
not encode a single value of either 1 or 0, but that they can
simultaneously represent superpositions of both values. This
difference is highlighted in Fig. 2. The surface of the unit ball
represents the set of all possible superpositions that a single
qubit can encode. It is also known as the Bloch sphere within
the quantum information community. On the Bloch sphere,
the poles correspond with classical limits of 1 and 0 and
represent the only possible states for a binary system, i.e., a
bit. By contrast, the value ψ of a qubit corresponds to one of
the infinite points on the spherical surface. This value can be
formalized by using the spherical poles as a two-dimensional
basis and the longitudinal and azimuthal angles θ and ϕ to
define the qubit value. There is an infinite number of these
values and, consequently, an infinite number of possible qubit
values.
The availability of an infinite set of possible qubits values
does not imply that an infinite amount of information can be
transmitted. It was first shown by Holevo that there is a limit
on how much information can be communicated using a qubit
and this maximum is precisely one bit per transmitted qubit
[1]. This bit of information is retrieved from a qubit whenever
a measurement is made. The measurement effectively projects
the qubit into one of the two poles of the Bloch sphere.
However, which of these two outcomes is observed depends
only partly on the value of the qubit being measured. For
example, when the incoming qubit has amplitudes c0 = cos θ
and c1 = sin θ with respect to the polar basis and ϕ = 0,
then the probabilities that the receiver records 0 and 1 are
given respectively as |c0|2 and |c1|2. The magnitudes only
describe the probability of a given observation - the actual
outcome is indeterminate prior to the measurement. In the
case of either outcome, however, the Holevo bound ensures
the qubit ψ provides only a single bit of information.
In addition to individual qubits, quantum communication
also permits preparing superpositions of multiple logical states.
The most straightforward example is to consider a pair of
qubits, each individually prepared. Qubits in this form are said
to be separable as each system can be described independently
from the other. Separable qubits, however, do not exhaust
the set of multi-qubit states permissible within quantum com-
munication. There are quantum states for two qubits which
can not be expressed in separable form. This property is the
formal definition of entanglement and it has been hailed as
the hallmark of quantum mechanics. Forming superpositions
of individual and multiple qubits is an important resource for
quantum communication and will underlie our discussion of
how quantum seals operate.
One of the most notable consequences of entanglement
is the apparent contradiction it poses to local realism, a
central tenet of classical physics. The contradiction arises from
the seemingly non-local correlations that can exists within
entangled states. Local correlations between both classical and
quantum bits are common, e.g., two well-defined transmissions
may produce correlated outcomes. But entangled qubits also
give rise to correlations which violate the common sense idea
that disparate, random (probabilistic) events can not be strictly
correlated. Even though individual measurement outcomes are
unpredictable, as described above, the combined outcomes
from a pair of entangled qubits can be perfectly correlated.
That this is true even when the qubits are very remote from
each other led to Albert Einstein’s infamous description of
“spooky action at a distance”. It was only later that John Bell
developed a framework to test the validity of local realism
with quantum mechanics. Commonly termed Bell tests, these
statements give upper limits for the strength of correlations
that any local theory can exhibit. The classical limits set by
these tests have been routinely violated by experiments us-
ing quantum mechanical systems including entangled photon
pairs. We will invoke a similar test as the diagnostic measure
of the quantum seal in Sec. IV.
III. QUANTUM OPTICAL COMMUNICATION
Realizing the novel aspects of quantum communication
requires adopting an encoding in some selected quantum
physical degree of freedom. As noted above, qubits store a
continuously variable value that mimics an analog signal up
to the time of measurement at which point it is converted into
a digital domain. Modulation corresponds with preparation
of the physical modes in a desired sequence just as is done
with conventional communication. Differences arise in how
measurements effect these modes and the correlations that can
persist between disparate signals. In this section, we describe
some of the ways that optical technology can be used to realize
quantum communication.
Over the past twenty years, individual photons have served
as the most prominent medium for quantum communication.
This use stems, in part, from the relative maturity of quantum
optical technology as well as its suitability for communication
applications. Techniques for generating single photons, both
on demand and probabilistically, have been the focus of intense
development [2]. As an example of these photon sources, the
process of spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC)
has seen widespread use for quantum communication ap-
plications. In the SPDC process, a high-energy pump pulse
composed from a macroscopic number of photons interacts
with a nonlinear optical medium. The medium mediates an
interaction in which the high-energy pump photon quickly
decays into a pair of lower energy photons typically termed
the signal and idler. A schematic of a basic experimental
setup using a nonlinear optical crystal as the down conversion
medium is shown in Fig. 3. The overall rate of this process is
exceptionally small with a probability on the order of 10−15.
For a macroscopic number of pump photons, this process can
be tuned to ensure with high probability that one photon is
down converted from each pump pulse. The resulting signal
and idler photons can then be used individually to encode
single qubits of information or used as a pair to encode an
entangled state.
Fig. 3: An illustration of the spontaneous parametric down
conversion (SPDC) process emphasizing the individual com-
ponents in a bulk-crystal source. A pump laser with frequency
ωp and longitudinal wave vector kp passes through a bulk
crystal that has a non-zero second-order non-linearity χ(2).
The nonlinear crystal mediates the down conversion of a pump
photon into a pair of lower-energy signal and idler photons.
The signal and idler respectively have frequencies ωs and ωi
and wave vectors ks and ki, where the conservation of energy
and momentum ensures ωp = ωs + ωi and kp = ks + ki.
The photon, as a quantum of light, provides a variety of dif-
ferent physical properties that can be used to encode quantum
information. This includes the spectral and spatial modes as
well as the polarization, transverse momentum, orbital angular
momentum, photon number, and field-quadrature variables.
In general, the quantized levels of each photonic degree of
freedom is appropriate for encoding. Polarization, for example,
can encode a 0 using the horizontal state and a 1 with the
vertical state. A polarization-encoded qubit is represented by
the superposition of these different polarizations.
Similarly, the spatial mode a photon occupies can encode
a logical value. An example is shown using the unbalanced
Mach-Zehnder interferometer in Fig. 4, where a single photon
passes through a beam splitter. The lossless beam splitter
operates by transmitting some portion of light while reflecting
the remainder. These binary path labels can be used to encode
0 and 1. For a single photon, this amounts to a probability
to either transmit or reflect through the beam splitter. When
these probabilities are both 50%, the photon is prepared in
an equal superposition of the transmitted and reflected modes
while the superposition state serves as a qubit. The two values
can be distinguished based on the arrival time of the photons.
In Fig. 4, a second beam splitter interferes the two photon
prior to measurement. We will see in the next section that
interference plays a crucial role in testing for entanglement.
Fig. 4: An unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer for
preparing a super-position of arrival times for a single photon.
The interferometer is constructed from a pair of 50:50 (non-
polarizing) beam splitters and two mirrors, which are arranged
to support one short path and one long path. These two distinct
spatial modes encode the binary basis for a qubit. While beam
splitter 1 separates the photon into two paths, beam splitter
2 recombines them. The two pathways may interfere at the
second beam splitter depending on the relative lengths and
the value of the applied phase in the longer path.
It is also possible to construct quantum optical sources
that provide good approximations to single-photon qubits
by using strongly attenuated laser pulses. A laser emits a
good approximation to a coherent beam of light that has a
near Gaussian shape in the phase-space defined by the field
quadratures. In the so-called ‘weak-pulse’ regime, the coherent
output from a conventional laser is heavily attenuated such that
the average number of photons per mode is much less than
one. This has the effect of reducing the strength of the field,
which is proportional to photon number, and draws the state
closer to the vacuum mode located at the origin. Because the
average energy is below the single-photon level, measurement
statistics for a weak pulse provide a fair approximation to what
is observed using individual photons.
IV. QUANTUM SEALS
There are several notable uses for quantum communi-
cation. These include quantum key distribution (QKD) for
establishing secure communications, quantum teleportation for
busing information within a quantum computer, entanglement
swapping for setting up long-distance quantum networks, and
quantum seals for monitoring the integrity of physical bound-
aries. While this section focuses on the operation of quantum
seals, many of the same principles of quantum communication
and quantum optical encoding arise in the discussion of these
other application domains.
Seals are widely used for verifying the integrity of enclosed
systems, including storage containers, physical perimeters,
and fiber networks. In the optical context, fiber-optic seals
are especially useful for actively surveying large areas or
inventories [3], [4], [5]. These seals typically operate by
confirming transmission of a classically encoded light pulse
from source to receiver, where tampering is indicated by either
the absence of the light or an error in the received encoding.
In the classical setting, detection of tampering assumes
the intruder is unable to accurately replicate the original
transmission. But if the attacker is able to perfectly replicate
the classical light, e.g., using either an optical repeater or a
priori knowledge, then classical instances of an optical seal
are vulnerable to intercept-resend spoofing, i.e., the man-in-the
middle attack. This vulnerability represents the attacker’s abil-
ity to measure the classical information, such as the frequency,
bandwidth, and modulation, that describes the state of the light
and to resend a corresponding replica. These capabilities are
well established in existing optical communication networks,
which make extensive use of optical repeaters, amplifiers, and
multiplexers for seamlessly replicating signals.
The vulnerability of classical signals to a man-in-the-middle
attack can be closed using a novel application of quantum
information. The basis for this “patch” is the no-cloning
theorem. The no-cloning theorem states that any attempt to
clone information describing a quantum physical system nec-
essarily introduces noise [6]. The consequence of the theorem
is that attempts to intercept and resend a replica of a quantum
system, e.g., an individual photon, are guaranteed to fail.
More important, the necessary imperfections of the man-in-
the-middle attack appear prominently in later measurements
made along the network. These quantum statistical anomalies
can be quickly discovered and their significance quantified as
part of a cyber-physical monitoring system.
The guarantees of the no-cloning theorem also underlie
the security offered by quantum key distribution (QKD). In
QKD, the non-local correlations inherent to quantum states are
used to establish correlated measurements outcomes between
users. However, any attempt by an eavesdropper to clone the
transmitted state introduces additional noise into the observed
measurements that reveal her presence to the users. Identifying
the eavesdropper requires a series of two-way communication
to compute a quantum bit-error rate that serves as a diagnostic
measurement of the physical layer. If categorized as being
secure, i.e., if the error is low enough, then the users continue
to negotiate the final secret key.
Quantum seals offers a more straightforward application of
the no-cloning theorem. A diagram of the seal operation is
shown in Fig. 5. The implementation describes a fiber-based
seal that is used for monitoring an inventory of physical con-
tainers [7]. The seal operates by transmitting a pair of photons
entangled in frequency that can be generated using SPDC
pumped by a narrowband laser, cf. Fig. 3. One of the photons
is transmitted through an active fiber potentially exposed to
tampering while the other passes through a reference link. For
the case of nominal link behavior, both photons reach the in-
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Fig. 5: An implementation of a quantum seal to monitor
critical infrastructure. The seal is composed from a quantum
transmitter based on SPDC that emits a pair of photons into
the active and reference fibers. Each fiber terminates at an
unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer. The interferometric
receivers measure the photon arrival times and a processing
system monitors the correlations. Attempts by an intruder to
replicate signals in the active fiber destroy the expected non-
local correlations. The loss of entanglement manifests as a
reduction in the measured correlations. When the measured
correlations fail to exceed the threshold set by the Bell test, it
is an indication that the seal has been compromised.
terferometric receivers. The Mach-Zhender interferometers in
these receivers operate much like the one discussed previously
in Fig. 4. Each photon may either transmit or reflect from
the first beam splitter. When the photon transmits it takes a
shorter path to the next beam splitter than those that reflect and
take a longer path. The two paths converge on a second beam
splitter that combines the respective short-path and long-path
amplitudes and forms a final superposition state. The photon is
then measured with respect to its time of arrival at the detector.
Quantum mechanically, the intrinsic uncertainty in the pho-
ton frequencies represents the information being transmitted.
Measurements at the two receivers appear as an unpredictable
series of arrival times. However, correlations between the
measurement times observed at the different receivers arise
because of the entanglement in the original photons. More-
over, when the photons sample the same path through the
interferometer, then the joint measurements cannot distinguish
between the case that both photons took the short path and the
case that both photons took the long path. The indistinguish-
ably leads to constructive interference. For the case that the
photons take different paths through the interferometers, e.g.,
short-long or long-short, then the measurements can be used
to identify exactly which case occurred and interference does
not occur.
The correlations that arise in the joint measurements can be
controlled through the described interference effect. A phase
modulator is placed in the long path of each interferometer. If
a photon travels the long path it picks up the applied phase,
which can be randomly selected from a predetermined set of
values. As a result, the interference between the long and short
path events is modulated by the applied phase. Notably, the
modulation depends on the phases applied in both interferome-
ters and only appears when analyzing the joint measurements.
The strength of the measured correlations can be quantified
by the depth, or visibility, of this interference modulation. For
a maximally entangled photon pair, the modulation can have
a maximal visibility of 1, while for locally correlated states
the visibility has a maximum of 0.71. Between this threshold
for non-locality and the maximum visibility is a large range
of acceptable values that permits noisy components and noisy
fibers to be used in constructing a quantum seal.
The visibility serves as a statistic for monitoring the in-
tegrity of the first photon. If the visibility remains above the
predefined threshold, then it signifies normal behavior and the
authenticity of the transmission can be confirmed. However, in
the presence of an intercept-resend attack on the active fiber,
the entanglement between the two photons would be destroyed
due to the no-cloning theorem. As a result, the visibility of a
compromised fiber vanishes and the attack is readily identified.
It is the restrictions based on quantum physics that provides
security of the physical signal and not the speed or complexity
of the transmission. Consequently, a quantum seal does not
store secret information, such as a key, but is a transparent
method for authenticating communication channels. Although
our description of a quantum seal has focused on a particular
encoding, namely, frequency entangled photons generated by
SPDC, alternative realizations are also possible including
weak-coherent pulse and single-photon implementations.
V. CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY
Conventional communication is a complex hierarchy of lay-
ers and protocols for synchronizing and sharing information.
Securing each layer is an equally complex task with its own hi-
erarchy of approaches. Among these, the physical layer stands
out as being immune to the information theoretic approaches
that characterize, for example, cryptographic security at the
application or session layers. This is because the type of as-
surances that must be provided are very different between the
physical and non-physical layers. Whereas the non-physical
layers attempt to prevent knowledge about the transmitted data,
securing the physical layer requires preventing access to the
transmitted signals.
Preventing access to the fiber that conducts the commu-
nication signal is perhaps the most straightforward approach
to securing the physical layer. However, as outlined in the
Introduction, this is not a practical approach given the large
footprints and impracticality of physical inspections. Com-
plementary to restricting physical access is the use of active
diagnostics, like optical time domain reflectometery (OTDR),
which characterize fiber health by probing with known signal.
The reflected probe pulses are measured and compared to
known reference traces as a means of monitoring changes
in the fiber health. The OTDR trace is exceptionally useful
for diagnosing faults in fiber networks and troubleshooting
connectivity problems. However, by using a classical probe
signal, OTDR is vulnerable to the same man-in-the-middle
attack that motivates the need for security.
The phenomenology of the quantum seal suggests a useful
alternative for monitoring the integrity of a communication
channel. Because the quantum seal is not vulnerable to the
man-in-the-middle attack, it is possible to authenticate the
transmission between two users. The authenticity of the quan-
tum signal transmitted through the channel can be verified
under the assumption of the no-cloning theorem. By evaluating
the fidelity of a received transmission against the threshold
expected by Bell’s test, a statistical measure of authenticity can
be generated. The ability for a quantum seal to authenticate
a communication link provides a new means of securing the
physical layer. The diagnostic measures from a quantum seal
can be part of a larger communication protocol that uses
these physical measurements to determine follow-on behavior.
Protocols that incorporate this type of measurement feedback
into the system behavior are called cyber-physical systems.
In the broadest sense, a cyber-physical system integrates
together the computational and physical elements of a sys-
tem. For our purposes, the integration of a quantum seal
with a communication receiver can be viewed as a small-
scale cyber-physical system. The quantum seal acts as the
physical element while the associated signal processing feeds
into the accompanying computational element. The diagnostic
measures provided by the seal drive the behavior of this cyber-
physical behavior, which can be tailored to the seal status.
In the simplest setting, the cyber-physical receiver may be
used to certify a burglar alarm for a physical premises or
to monitor dedicated fiber-to-the-home links for unauthorized
access or loss in services. On even larger scales, the seal
health status of a cyber-physical receiver can be used to make
routing decisions through optical networks or for the selection
of cryptographic requirements when link security is suspicious.
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Fig. 6: The integration of a quantum seal with a cyber-physical
monitoring system, in which the transmitter multiplexes quan-
tum and classical signals and the receivers exchange infor-
mation about the state of the seal using wireless communi-
cations. In this example, the transmitter routes packets from
the network gateway through the active fiber only when the
state of the seal is verified as normal. The receivers in this
example may communicate observations via wireless or wired
communication. Setting up the sharing of information between
these different components will require standardization of the
quantum physical sublayer and how those measurements are
integrated into a communication system.
An implementation of a cyber-physical system using a
quantum seal for monitoring the physical layer is shown in
Fig. 6. The setup consists of a combined quantum-classical
transmitter that accesses a pair of channels denoted as the
active and reference links. The transmitter contains a quantum
light source, like the SPDC source highlighted in Fig. 5,
to transmit one photon down the active fiber and the other
down the reference link. At the end of each fiber, an inter-
ferometric receiver measures the photon arrival time just as
the unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer in Fig. 4. Local
measurements are then shared with neighboring receivers in
order to establish the seal health using a Bell test for non-
locality.
The implication of the design in Fig. 6 is that the quan-
tum transmitter and receivers implement a quantum physical
sublayer. The role of this new sublayer is to certify the
integrity and authenticity of the active link. However, the
physical sublayer only provides measurement feedback while
seal certification requires interaction with the ’cyber’ elements
of the system. In this example, the transmitters and receivers
must communicate local measurements to a common location,
such as the original transmitter, that calculates the correlation
visibility. This diagnostic is then evaluated with respect to
the quantum-classical threshold to make a statement about
link health. Nominal behavior is indicated when the observed
correlations are above the threshold, while below threshold
measurements indicates abnormal behavior and a likely attack.
When a quantum physical sublayer indicates abnormal be-
havior within the channel, the receiver can flag the link as be-
ing abnormal or insecure. This information can be used either
for independent monitoring of fiber health or for integrating
into higher protocol layers. For example, the identification of
insecure links using the state of the quantum seal can serve
to update policies in the data link and network layers. These
higher layers can then inform decisions to the application
layer, for example, about the cryptographic security necessary
to establish a secure length.
The development of a quantum physical sublayer provides
a useful capability for certifying the health of a fiber link.
Collections of these cyber-physical system can be linked to
together to form certifiably secure paths across a network.
These types of networks may include communication net-
works, intrusion detection systems, and other sensor systems
in need of authenticated signals.
VI. SUMMARY OUTLOOK
There are several outstanding research and development
issues that must be overcome before adoption of quantum
physical layer security. This includes standardization of how
quantum information fits into a protocol suite and what is
required by a quantum physical sublayer implementation. The
emergence of cyber-physical systems may offer a natural
opportunity for resolving these integration issues and provide
a convenient path to introducing new concepts for the physical
layer.
The hardware required by a quantum physical sublayer is
very similar to that called for by existing and forthcoming
QKD communication systems. Both quantum seals and QKD
require transmitters and receivers for single-photon or weak
pulse signals. Several commercial QKD vendors, such as
Id Quantique and QuintessenceLabs, already offer integrated
systems containing these types of components. The main chal-
lenge for both quantum seals and cryptographic applications
is the extension of these system to existing fiber networks.
Recent research has shown it is possible for both quantum
and classical channels to coexist [8], while the construction
of larger communication architectures has been the subject of
several test bed studies [9], [10], [11].
There are notable differences between monitoring the phys-
ical layer and the cryptographic security offered by QKD.
Whereas QKD provides support to multiple protocol layers
as part of a communication service, it is motivated by the
potential for more conventional cryptography to be compro-
mised, e..g, with the advent of quantum computers. Quantum
seals, by contrast, are limited to monitoring the PHY layer
and addressing the man-in-the-middle vulnerability that has
already materialized. In addition, the computational and com-
munication complexity of implementing a quantum physical
sublayer is also small relative to a QKD service. For example,
a quantum seal does not require the costly computations
needed to generate a secret key through multiple rounds of
communication like with QKD. Thus, a quantum physical
sublayer may be viewed as the near-term infrastructure needed
to support future QKD services.
In summary, we have described an application of quantum
communication for securing the physical layer that is common
throughout communication protocols. The quantum seal uses
the unique physical phenomenology of quantum signal to iden-
tify tampering and man-in-the-middle attacks. Like quantum
cryptography, the technological basis for this security requires
building and fielding transmitters and receivers that operate
within the quantum regime of light.
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